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Abstract 
With the mandate of No Child Left Behind, high-stakes achievement testing is 
firmly in place in every state. The few studies that have explored the effectiveness 
of high-stakes testing using NAEP scores have yielded mixed results. This study 
considered state demographic characteristics for each NAEP testing period in 
reading, writing, mathematics, and science from 1992 through 2002, in an effort to 
examine the relation of high-stakes testing policies to achievement and changes in 
achievement between testing periods. As expected, demographic characteristics and 
their changes were related significantly to most achievement outcomes, but high-
stakes testing policies demonstrated few relationships with achievement. The few 
relationships between high-stakes testing and achievement or improvement in 
reading, writing, or science tended to appear only when demographic data were 
missing; and the minimal relationships with math achievement were consistent with 
findings in previous research. Considering the cost and potential unintended 
negative consequences, high-stakes testing policies seem to provide a questionable 
means of improving student learning. 
Keywords: high-stakes tests; national competency tests; evaluation; educational 
policy; academic standards. 
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Relaciones entre las políticas educativas de pruebas de alto impacto (high-
stakes testing) y el logro académico de los estudiantes, después de controlar 
factores demográficos en datos agregados 
Resumen 
Con el mandato “Ningún Niño(a) Rezagado” (No Child Left Behind), las pruebas 
de alto impacto sobre el logro académico de los estudiantes se han plantado 
firmemente en cada estado. Los pocos estudios que han explorado la efectividad de 
los exámenes de alto impacto usando los resultados de la Evaluación Nacional del 
Progreso Educativo (NAEP) han producido resultados mixtos. En un esfuerzo por 
examinar la relación de las políticas sobre pruebas de alto impacto con el logro 
académico y los cambios en el logro académico entre los períodos de pruebas, este 
estudio tomó en cuenta características demográficas de cada estado para cada 
período de pruebas de la NAEP en lectura, escritura, matemáticas y ciencias desde 
1992 hasta 2002. Como se esperaba, las características demográficas y sus cambios, 
están significativamente relacionados con la mayoría de resultados de logro 
académico. Por otro lado, las políticas de pruebas de alto impacto demostraron 
pocas relaciones con el logro académico. Las escasas relaciones entre las pruebas de 
alto impacto y el logro o mejoramiento en lectura, matemáticas o ciencias 
aparecieron solamente cuando no se incluían datos demográficos; y las relaciones 
mínimas con los resultados en el área de matemáticas son consistentes con los 
resultados de investigaciones previas. Tomando en cuenta el costo y el potencial de 
producir consecuencias negativas, las políticas de exámenes de grandes 
consecuencias parecieran ofrecer un medio dudoso de mejorar los resultados de 
aprendizaje académico de los/as estudiantes.  
Introduction 
The American public education system is known for jumping on bandwagons of programs 
and curriculum innovations without a thorough evaluation of their effectiveness. The most public 
(at least in the educational research community) example of this problem emerged with evaluations 
of the Hunter Method. As whole states were incorporating these approaches into curriculum, 
training, and teacher evaluation, the costly program was evaluated and deemed ineffective (Slavin, 
1989). One of the largest bandwagons that has been building speed for more than a decade, and 
received a giant push with the passing of the No Child Left Behind federal legislation, is the use of 
standardized achievement tests as accountability measures for states, districts, schools, teachers, and 
most importantly, students. When such accountability is associated with serious consequences, the 
tests are termed high-stakes (American Educational Research Association, 2000). Advocates believe 
that testing, and its associated standards and consequences, provide direction and motivation for 
achievement. However, this bandwagon has been called a Trojan horse (Corno, 2000; Paris, 2000) 
for the unintended negative consequences that have been identified (Amrein & Berliner, 2002c; 
Jones, Jones, & Hargrove, 2003; Marchant, 2005; Marchant & Paulson, 2005). 
Currently all states have established testing programs to meet the No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) mandate. However, it is still unclear whether these programs are indeed in the best interests 
of those who stand to gain or lose the most: America’s public education students. Little research has 
been conducted to assess the influences of accountability systems on education in general and on 
student learning in particular. It is unclear at this point whether or not the intended goals of 
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accountability systems are being realized (Amrein & Berliner, 2002a; Linn, 2000; Steinberg, 2003). 
Although NCLB is a federal mandate of accountability, its implementation varies greatly from state 
to state, with some states having had testing programs in place long before being required. The 
ultimate goal of accountability systems established by NCLB is to increase student achievement 
(such that every child will reach “proficiency” on state-determined achievement tests by academic 
year 2014–2015); therefore, one of the ways that the effectiveness of high-stakes testing policies 
could be assessed would be to compare students’ achievement in states that had established 
accountability systems prior to the 2002 testing mandate to those that had not. The one database 
with comparable state-level achievement data for all 50 states is that of the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP, also referred to as the Nation’s Report Card; Jones & Olkin, 2004). 
Some studies have used the NAEP data to assess the effects of high-stakes testing on student 
achievement, with varying results (Amrein & Berliner, 2002a, 2002b; Braun, 2004; Carnoy & Loeb, 
2002; Rosenshine, 2003; Nichols, Glass, & Berliner, 2006). However, differences exist in how each 
of these studies identified each state as high-stakes and what potentially confounding variables are 
included as controls. 
In their study using NAEP data, Amrein and Berliner (2002a, 2002b) examined longitudinal 
changes in NAEP scores before and after states implemented high-stakes testing policies. Although 
they found that some states did show small gains, other states did not, and they concluded that there 
was no compelling evidence that the implementation of high-stakes testing improved student 
achievement. They argued that states could show gains in test scores by excluding certain groups of 
students (disabled or limited English proficient); however, they did not systematically control for 
specific student characteristics that may have biased the testing samples. In contrast, Rosenshine 
(2003) reported overall gains on the NAEP in states with high-stakes testing; however, he also did 
not control for any student demographic characteristics that may potentially be confounded with 
these gains. In their study of NAEP data, Carnoy and Loeb (2002) used recursive regression models 
that would correct for some of the limitations of previous studies. In particular, they created a 
measure of the strength of each state’s accountability system (rather than just identifying the date of 
implementation of high-stakes testing) that included specific characteristics of individual states like 
funding, ethnicity, and population. They also controlled for the student characteristics most known 
to be confounded with achievement gains (ethnicity and inclusion/exclusion from testing). Their 
results showed positive relationships between states’ level of accountability and gains in NAEP 
scores.  
However, two major flaws still can be identified in this study. First, although they controlled 
for demographic characteristics of students, the authors failed to control for those characteristics 
known to be highly related to achievement outcomes: family income and parent education levels (see 
Eccles, 2005; Entwisle, Alexander, & Steffel Olsen, 2005; Sirin, 2005; and White, 1982, for 
discussions of hundreds of research studies confirming the relationships between family income or 
parent education and children’s achievement). There is considerable variation among states on these 
family factors and it has been shown that even small changes in demographic characteristics of a 
testing sample can produce large changes in achievement (Marchant, 2005). Second, Carnoy and 
Loeb (2002) only assessed changes in math scores. The NAEP also measures reading, writing, and 
science. One cannot generalize findings regarding math as evidence that high-stakes testing policies 
lead to positive gains in all student achievement. In 2004, Braun reanalyzed relative gains for states 
on the NAEP mathematics tests while controlling for percentage of students excluded from the 
testings. His results favored high-stakes testing states when comparing the same grade levels (i.e., 
fourth grade at one testing period to fourth grade four years later), but his results favored low-stakes 
testing states when comparing a cohort of fourth graders to eighth graders four years later. 
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Most recently, Nichols and her colleagues (2006) replicated Carnoy and Loeb’s (2002) work, 
but they added their own indicator of “pressure” of accountability and they assessed the results for 
reading achievement as well. Several of their conclusions are relevant to the current study. First, they 
concurred with Carnoy and Loeb that higher strength of accountability (particularly greater high 
stakes testing pressure) might reflect positively in math scores at the primary level (fourth grade), but 
they claimed that pattern existed only because primary math curricula may be more responsive than 
others to the drill and practice exhibited by schools under greater accountability pressure. Indeed, 
neither higher grade (eighth) math nor reading proficiency was affected by greater strength (or 
pressure) of accountability. The authors argued that even small gains in math among African 
American students may be difficult to interpret because exclusions from testing which increase at 
higher grade levels may call into question the validity of some findings. But this study also neglected 
to control for what Berliner (2005) considered the “600 pound gorilla”—family factors, namely 
family income; and some might argue that parent education is equally important (Marchant, 2005; 
Marchant & Paulson, 2005; Sirin, 2005). Any changes in achievement scores aggregated by state 
cannot be interpreted without first controlling for potential changes in the factors known to be most 
highly correlated with students’ achievement outcomes.  
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship of states’ high-stakes testing 
policies to students’ NAEP achievement after controlling for differences in students’ demographic 
characteristics known to be related to NAEP achievement: family income, parent education, 
ethnicity, and exclusion of disabled or limited English proficient students. Ethnicity and exclusion of 
disabled and LEP students were included because of researchers’ recognition of their importance, 
reflected in other studies of high stakes testing, in particular those using NAEP data (e.g., Braun, 
2004; Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; Nichols et al., 2006). Family income and parent education were added 
to the analyses to demonstrate the significant impact these factors also have in explaining 
achievement differences among states (Marchant, 2005). It was not the intention of the authors of 
this study to replicate either Carnoy and Loeb (2002) or Nichols et al. (2006). Instead, we used what 
we considered to be more conventional statistical techniques to demonstrate the importance of 
considering family income and parent education levels of test-takers in comparing groups (i.e., 
states) on aggregated achievement data. Indeed, we believed that we could affirm Nichols’ and 
colleagues’ contention that high stakes testing policies do little to produce higher achievement even 
when the stakes are highest. 
The study assessed the influence of high-stakes testing policies using three indicators: 
whether or not high-stakes testing was implemented, the number of years high-stakes testing had 
been in place (both employed by Amrein and Berliner, 2002a, 2002b), and the strength of 
accountability index employed by Carnoy and Loeb (2002). These indicators were used for all four 
subject areas assessed by the NAEP: reading, writing, math, and science. Because individual student 
data on the NAEP were not available for this study, data were aggregated into “testing samples,” 
defined as the group of students in each state, at each grade level (fourth and eighth grades), during 
each NAEP testing period (e.g., 1992, 1996, and 2000 for math; or 1994, 1998, and 2002 for 
reading). Although a total of 300 testing samples might be possible for each subject area (two grade 
levels x three testing periods x 50 states, including DC—South Dakota did not participate), some 
states did not administer the test at every testing period, some states did not administer the test to 
both grade levels, and demographic data were missing for some testing samples (see Table 1 and 
Appendix A for an overview of available data).  
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Table 1 
States with different configurations of NAEP data available for analysis, 1992–2002 
 Reading  Writing 
Year 1992 1994 1998 1998 2002 2002  1998 2002 2002 
Grade 4 4 4 8 4 8  8 4 8 
Missing 
Data 
$ 
Edu. 
$ 
Edu. 
 
Edu.  
 
Edu.    
 
Edu. 
 
 
Total 
States 42 40 40 37 44 42  36 44 42 
 Math  Science 
Year 1992 1992 1996 1996 2000 2000  1996 2000 2000 
Grade 4 8 4 8 4 8  8 4 8 
Missing 
Data 
$ 
Edu. 
$ 
Edu. 
 
Edu.  
 
Edu.    
 
Edu. 
 
 
Total 
States 42 42 44 41 41 40  41 39 38 
$ = family income; Edu. = parent education 
 
The relationships between high-stakes testing policies and student achievement were 
assessed in three ways: relationships to single-year achievement, relationships to changes in 
achievement between testing periods within each grade level (fourth grade and eighth grade), and 
relationships to changes in achievement between testing periods within a cohort (fourth to eighth 
grade), using the following research questions.  
Relationships to single year achievement. Do achievement scores differ between states with 
and without high stakes testing; do the demographic characteristics of the testing samples predict 
their achievement; and with the demographic characteristics controlled, do indicators of high-stakes 
testing policies predict the achievement of testing samples? 
Relationships between testing periods within grade level. Do changes in achievement scores 
within grade level from one testing period to the testing period four years later (e.g., changes in 
fourth grade testing samples from one testing period to fourth grade testing samples four years later) 
differ between states with and without high stakes testing; do the changes in demographic 
characteristics of the testing samples predict these changes in achievement between two testing 
periods; and with the demographic characteristics controlled, do indicators of high-stakes testing 
policies predict changes in achievement between testing periods (within each grade level)? 
Relationships between testing periods within a cohort. Do changes in achievement scores of 
cohort testing samples from their fourth grade testing period to their eighth grade testing period 
differ between states with and without high stakes testing; do the changes in demographic 
characteristics of cohort testing samples predict changes in achievement from fourth grade to eighth 
grade; and with the demographic characteristics controlled, do indicators of high-stakes testing 
policies predict changes in achievement of cohort testing samples from fourth to eighth grade? 
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Method 
Units of Analysis 
The units of analysis in this study were the testing samples of students taking the NAEP. A 
testing sample was defined as the group of students in one grade level (fourth grade or eighth grade) 
who took the NAEP at any given testing period (e.g., 1992, 1996, 2000) in one state (there were 50 
states including DC, excluding SD). Therefore, any one state could have a total of 6 possible testing 
samples (fourth and eighth grade samples at each of three testing periods), for a total of 300 (50 x 6) 
possible testing samples (see Appendix A for a complete display of available testing samples), each 
with a unique set of demographic characteristics and unique achievement score. However, it is 
important to note that not every state administered the test at each testing period or to both grade 
levels, and many states were missing demographic data for some testing samples; therefore the 
number of “participants” varied among testing periods (see Table 1 and Appendix A). In addition, 
the writing and science subject tests were administered at only two testing periods, so there were 
fewer testing samples for those subjects. The number of valid testing samples is reported in the 
results section for each analysis. 
Measures 
NAEP achievement. Three indicators of NAEP achievement were used in this study. First, 
scale scores and changes in scale scores were used as the primary indicators of achievement. Scale 
scores were used as they represent average levels of achievement and gains in achievement across all 
students within the testing samples. Given the wide variability, scale scores would likely be most 
sensitive to any difference or changes in achievement that might exist. 
Second, the percentage of students reaching proficiency and changes in the percentage of 
students reaching proficiency across testing years were used as another indicator of NAEP 
achievement. The major goal of NCLB is for 100% of students to reach proficiency on their state 
achievement tests by academic year 2014–2015. The federal legislation requires that schools and 
states report the percentage of students who reach Proficient, with that statistic tied to sanctions 
when federally mandated goals are not met. Similarly, in the current study, the percentage of 
students reaching Proficient (and changes in these percentages across testing years) on the NAEP 
was of interest (and likewise used in previous studies—see Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; Nichols et al., 
2006). Unfortunately, the cut scores for reaching levels of Proficient may not necessarily match the 
levels of achievement specified as Proficient across states. Indeed, there is some indication that the 
level of Proficient on the NAEP is set higher than what most states would regard as Proficient 
(Fuller, Gesicki, Kang, & Wright, 2006; Linn, 2000) and its validity has not been tested against actual 
student knowledge (Linn, 2000). Also, states often change their own cut-scores over time, making 
comparisons across states using any assessment difficult (Linn, 2001). In fact, some states have 
lowered their cut-scores so that they can meet the requirements set by NCLB to reach 100% 
proficiency. Unfortunately, this practice does not allow states to differentiate between gains of lower 
performing and higher performing students because a greater range of students is being “shifted” 
into the Proficient levels. Therefore, although Proficient on the NAEP may not be aligned with state 
levels of Proficient, using percentage of students reaching Proficient on the NAEP as one of the 
achievement indicators allowed us to assess the impact of high-stakes testing policies on the higher 
performing students (a group often ignored when assessing growth in achievement). 
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Nevertheless, being mindful of the limitations of using percent Proficient as one of the 
achievement indicators, we chose to include percentage of students reaching Basic as our third 
indicator of achievement. It has been argued that the Basic level on the NAEP may be more closely 
aligned to levels of Proficient across states (Fuller et al., 2006). Using percentage of students 
reaching Basic also allowed us to examine the changes in the achievement of lower performing 
students. This way we could compare the differential effects of high-stakes testing on lower and 
higher performing students.  
Demographic characteristics. Survey and school records data were collected at the time of 
each NAEP testing. Demographic data for each testing sample included one or more of the 
following characteristics (see Table 1 for missing variables): low family income (percentage of test-
takers eligible for the federal free and reduced lunch program), parent education (percentage of test-
takers with a parent with a college degree), ethnicity (percentage of Black and Hispanic test-takers), 
and excluded test-takers (percent of disabled and limited English proficient [LEP] test-takers 
excluded from testing).  
High-stakes testing policy indicators. Three indicators of high-stakes testing policies were 
derived from two former studies. In their study, Amrein and Berliner (2002b) identified when each 
state initiated high-stakes testing policies. Those dates were used to establish whether a high-stakes 
testing policy was in place at the time of each NAEP testing. Therefore, in the current study, each 
testing sample was identified as to whether or not it belonged in the high-stakes group. That date 
also was used to establish, as a second indicator, the number of years high-stakes testing had been in 
place for each testing sample. The third high-stakes testing policy indicator was the high-stakes index 
developed by Carnoy and Loeb (2002) in their study using the NAEP. This strength of 
accountability indicator is measured on a scale of 0 to 5 and is based on several factors present 
before 2001 accountability mandates were in place. According to the scale’s creators, it “captures 
degrees of state external pressure on schools to improve student achievement according to state-
defined performance criteria” (Carnoy & Loeb, 2002, p. 311). The factors to determine each states’ 
accountability index included whether or not states tested at the elementary and middle school 
levels, whether or not test results were reported to the state, whether or not scores were subject to 
sanctions or rewards (and the strength of such sanctions), and whether or not a high school exit 
exam was present.  
Analysis Procedures 
The purpose of this study was to determine if states’ high-stakes testing policies contributed 
significantly to students’ NAEP achievement beyond what could be predicted based on the 
demographic characteristics of test-takers. Multiple regressions were used to examine the 
relationships of the indicators of high-stakes testing policies to each of the indicators of NAEP 
achievement, after controlling for demographic characteristics. Results are reported separately for 
each subject area of the NAEP. 
Results 
Reading 
Single year achievement. Means and standard deviations for the three indicators of students’ 
reading achievement (NAEP scale score, percentage of students reaching Basic, and percentage of 
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students reaching Proficient) and the demographic characteristics of all available testing samples are 
shown in Table 2, separated by whether or not the testing samples came from states identified as 
high-stakes at the time of the testing. There were 245 valid testing samples (94 samples in states with 
high stakes testing and 151 in states without high stakes testing); however, family income was not 
available for the 1992 or 1994 testing periods, and parent education was not available for any of the 
fourth grade testing samples. A listwise deletion of testing samples with missing data within each 
analysis produced smaller samples sizes for the analyses that included family income and/or parent 
education (slight variations in samples sizes across analyses are due to single cases of missing data 
within one or two states’ data). Sample sizes are shown in the tables for each analysis. 
Results revealed that across all testing samples, there were no differences between those with 
high stakes testing and those without high stakes testing on either reading scale scores or percentage 
of students reaching Basic on the reading achievement portion of the NAEP; however, those with 
high-stakes testing policies in place had a lower proportion of students reaching Proficient than did 
those without high-stakes testing. The demographic characteristics of the testing samples with and 
without high-stakes testing also differed significantly: in high stakes states, the percentage of families 
with low income was higher, the percentage of parents with a college education was lower, the 
percentage Black and Hispanic students was higher, and the percentage of students excluded from 
testing was higher (see Table 2). Indeed, bivariate correlations between the demographics and 
reading scale scores revealed that all four demographic factors were significantly associated with a 
higher scores: lower percentage of families with low income (n = 163, r = -.54, p < .001), higher 
percentage of parents with a college education (n = 78, r = .65, p < .001), lower percentage of Black 
and Hispanic students (n = 245, r = -.23, p < .001), and lower percentage of disabled and LEP 
students excluded from testing (n = 245, r = -.23, p < .01). 
 
Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Single Year Reading Achievement and Demographics 
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
Variable 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score — 151 227.79 22.82 94 233.26 24.08 -1.78 
% Above Basic .81*** 151 64.72 11.62 94 64.41 10.02 0.21 
% Above Proficient .34*** 151 29.91 9.53 94 26.98 6.11 2.93** 
% Low family income -.54*** 85 37.27 12.38 78 43.13 11.29 -3.15** 
% Parent college educ .65*** 39 45.74 6.51 39 41.62 5.67 2.99** 
% Black/Hispanic -.23*** 151 21.21 19.74 94 30.66 14.78 -4.00***
% Excluded disabled -.23** 151 5.99 2.18 94 7.15 2.42 -3.93***
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
In the regression analyses (see Table 3), the four demographic factors predicted almost 70% 
of the variance among testing samples on all three indicators of reading achievement (68% of scale 
scores, 65% of percentage reaching Basic, and 72% of percentage reaching Proficient), with each 
demographic factor making a unique contribution to the prediction (Beta coefficients are reported in 
Table 3). In the second step of the regression, the high-stakes testing indicators did not add to the 
prediction of any of the reading achievement factors. 
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In addition, because parent education data were not available for fourth grade testing 
samples, a second regression was run without parent education in the equation, thereby effectively 
doubling the sample size (see Table 3). Without parent education, the demographic factors now 
accounted for 35% of the variance in scale scores, 53% of the variance in percentage reaching Basic 
and 48% of the variance percentage reaching Proficient. Beyond demographics, the high stakes 
testing variables now accounted for 11% of the variance in scale scores and 9% of the variance in 
percentage of students reaching Basic, but no additional variance in percentage of students reaching 
Proficient. In fact, the beta coefficients revealed that samples having high stakes testing had lower 
reading scores and fewer students reaching Basic (as indicated by the negative coefficient). However, 
in high stakes samples, years of testing and the high-stakes index predicted higher achievement. In 
general, these analyses indicate that demographics are considerably more significant in predicting 
students’ reading achievement than indicators of high stakes testing; in fact, the effects of high 
stakes testing on scale scores and reaching Basic disappears when parent education is present in the 
equation.  
 
Table 3 
Predicting Three Indicators of Single Year Reading Achievement  
 Scale Score % Above Basic % Above Proficient 
 parent edu no parent edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu 
Variable n = 77 n = 162 n = 77 n = 162 n = 77 n = 162 
Demographics R2 =.68*** R2 =.35*** R2 =.65*** R2 =.53*** R2 =.72*** R2 =.48***
 % Low income -0.21* -0.62*** -0.17 -0.65*** -0.30** -0.52*** 
 % Parent college 0.50*** — 0.42*** — 0.49*** — 
 % Black/Hispanic -0.38*** 0.27** -0.47*** -0.07 -0.31*** -0.27*** 
 % Excl/disabled 0.28*** -0.24** 0.27* -0.11 0.20** 0.05 
High Stakes Indicator R2 =.03 R2  =.11*** R2 =.03 R2 =.09*** R2 =.03 R2 =.02 
 Present (yes/no) -0.06 -0.18 -0.06 -0.24** -0.09 -0.20 
 Years w/ testing 0.20 0.39*** 0.22 0.43*** 0.13 0.19 
 High-Stakes Index 0.11 0.23** 0.09 0.17* 0.20 0.12 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
Four-year change in reading achievement within grade level. Means and standard deviations 
for changes in reading achievement and the changes in demographic characteristics between four 
year testing periods within the same grade levels (fourth to fourth grade and eighth to eighth grade) 
are shown in Table 4, separated by whether or not high-stakes testing policies were present during 
the change period. There were 106 valid testing samples: 35 states participated in fourth grade 
reading testing in both 1994 and 1998, 37 states participated in fourth grade reading testing in both 
1998 and 2002, and 34 states participated in eighth grade reading testing in both 1998 and 2002. 
Results revealed that high stakes samples demonstrated slightly greater gains in scale scores (less 
than two points) and in percentage of students reaching Basic (less than 2%), but no gains in 
proportion of students reaching Proficient reading levels. In addition, high stakes samples had a 
slightly greater increase in percentage of low-income families (only 2%). There were no significant 
bivariate correlations between changes in demographic factors and changes in reading achievement 
between testing periods (see Table 4).  
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations of Change in Reading Achievement (Same Grade) 
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
Variable 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score .98*** 53 0.32 4.02 53 1.97 4.55 -2.30* 
% Above Basic .93*** 53 0.15 3.92 53 1.89 5.33 -2.26* 
% Above Proficient .87*** 53 0.74 2.80 53 1.83 3.51 -1.78 
% Low family income -.25 31 2.16 4.33 40 4.16 3.73 -2.09* 
% Parent college educ .31 13 3.31 2.98 20 3.50 2.50 -0.20 
% Black/Hispanic .08 53 1.32 2.85 53 1.92 4.04 -0.89 
% Excluded disabled .16 53 -0.41 2.14 53 -0.20 2.99 -0.43 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
In the regression analyses (see Table 5), the demographic characteristics together predicted 
no significant change in reading scale scores, or in percentage reaching Basic, but predicted 33% of 
the change in students reaching Proficient within grade levels (R2 = .33, p < .05), with parent 
education and percentage of disabled and LEP students excluded from the testing contributing 
significant amounts of unique variance (Beta coefficients are shown in Table 3). The high-stakes 
testing indicators did not add significantly to the prediction of changes in any indicators of reading 
achievement. In a second regression, excluding parent education (effectively doubling the sample 
size by including fourth grade testing samples), the changes in demographics significantly accounted 
for 20%, 24% and 18% of the variance in changes in reading scale scores, proportion of students 
reaching Basic, and proportion of students reaching Proficient, respectively; but high stakes testing 
indicators predicted no additional variance.  
It should be noted that when predicting change scores, the proportions of variance predicted 
will be smaller than when predicting single year scores due to restrictions of range and variability; 
thus R2 coefficients were around 20–30% in these analyses, rather than the 60–70% seen in the 
previous analyses. Similarly, we felt compelled to note that although the high stakes indicators were 
predicting as much as 9% of additional variance in changes in reading achievement, they were not 
significant because of the lower number of samples in the analyses. We were especially intrigued by 
the pattern of relationships revealed by the Beta coefficients. Whereas having high stakes testing was 
indicative of greater changes in reading achievement, more years of testing and higher index scores 
predicted smaller changes in achievement. Although these patterns are interesting, it was the 
demographic factors that continued to account for a significantly greater proportion of the variance 
in changes in reading achievement than any indicator of high stakes testing. 
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Table 5 
Predicting Change in Three Indicators of Reading Achievement (Same Grade) 
 Scale Score % Above Basic % Above Proficient 
 parent edu no parent edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu 
 n = 77 n = 162 n = 77 n = 162 n = 77 n = 162 
Demographics R2 = .26 R2 = .20** R2 = .29 R2 = .24* R2 = .33* R2 = .18**
 % Low income -0.07 -0.17 -0.15 -0.08 -0.04 -0.17 
 % Parent college 0.27 — 0.11 — 0.33* — 
 % Black/Hispanic -0.03 0.34** -0.07 -0.07 0.13 0.27* 
 % Excl/disabled 0.40 0.41** 0.45 0.44* 0.48** 0.40** 
High Stakes Indicator R2 = .09 R2  = .06 R2 = .05 R2 = .07 R2 = .09 R2 = .09 
 Present (yes/no) 0.52 0.41 0.23 0.27 0.52 0.51 
 Years w/ testing -0.30 -0.39 0.03 0.01 -0.28 -0.42 
 High-Stakes Index -0.27 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.19 -0.03 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
 
Four-year change in reading achievement within cohort. Means and standard deviations for 
the change in reading achievement and the changes in demographic characteristics between four year 
testing periods within the same cohort (fourth to eighth grade) are shown in Table 6, separated by 
whether or not high-stakes testing policies were present during the change period. There were 68 
valid testing samples: 33 states participated in fourth to eighth grade reading testing from 1994 to 
1998 and 35 states participated in fourth to eighth grade reading testing from 1998 to 2002. (Note 
that parent education data were not available within cohorts because those data were not collected in 
fourth grade testing samples.) High stakes samples had a slightly greater increase in proportion of 
students reaching Basic (less than 3%) and a slightly smaller decrease in the percentage of low-
income families than did samples without high stakes testing (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations of Change in Reading Achievement (Cohort) 
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score .94*** 34 48.59 4.90 34 49.68 3.72 -1.03 
% Above Basic .90*** 34 14.12 4.69 34 16.56 4.49 -2.19*
% Above Proficient .68*** 34 1.88 2.96 34 2.53 3.10 -0.88 
% Low family income -.45** 14 -7.59 5.16 21 -4.48 3.01 -2.26*
% Parent college educ — — — — — — — — 
% Black/Hispanic -.19 34 2.18 3.14 34 1.24 3.77 1.12 
% Excluded disabled .22 34 -1.59 2.25 34 -1.50 3.21 -0.14 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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In the regression analyses, the demographic characteristics significantly predicted changes in 
percentage of students reaching Basic (27% of the variance) and percentage of students reaching 
Proficient (28% of the variance) from fourth to eighth grade (see Table 7), but the high-stakes 
testing indicators did not add to the prediction of any of the achievement indicators. This regression, 
however, included only the 1998–2002 cohort, because parent income data were not available in the 
1994 fourth grade sample. A second regression was run without family income, thereby effectively 
doubling the sample size (including both cohorts, 1994–1998 and 1998–2002). The demographic 
factors continued to predict a significant proportion of the variance in the change in percentage of 
students reaching Basic (R2 = .14, p < .01) and students reaching Proficient (R2 = .12, p < .05). In 
addition, the high stakes indicators predicted 16% of additional variance in change in percentage 
reaching Basic (see Table 7), with the high stakes indicators positively predicting greater changes in 
achievement within cohort. Unfortunately, due to missing data, it is impossible to know whether or 
not the high stakes indicators would have remained significant had we been able to control from 
parent education. However, trends from other analyses would suggest that the addition of parent 
education would weaken the effects of high stakes testing. 
 
Table 7 
Predicting Change in Three Indicators of Reading Achievement (Cohort Group) 
 Scale Score % Above Basic % Above Proficient 
 income no income income no income income no income 
 n = 34 n = 67 n = 34 n = 67 n = 34 n = 67 
Demographics R2 = .20 R2 = .07 R2 = .27* R2 = .14** R2 = .28* R2 = .12* 
 % Low income -0.19 — -0.15 — -0.18 — 
 % Parent college — — — — — — 
 % Black/Hispanic -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.15 -0.10 -0.30* 
 % Excl/disabled 0.29 0.20 0.41 0.28* 0.37 0.09 
High Stakes Indicator R2 = .13 R2 = .10 R2 = .17 R2 = .16** R2 = .12 R2 = .02 
 Present (yes/no) 0.42 0.07 0.33 0.04 0.50 0.09 
 Years w/ testing -0.28 -0.04 -0.10 0.12 -0.47 -0.13 
 High-Stakes Index 0.18 0.30 0.22 0.31* 0.12 0.14 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
Writing 
Single year achievement. Means and standard deviations for the three indicators of writing 
achievement and the demographic characteristics of all available testing samples are shown in Table 
8, separated by whether or not the testing sample came from a state identified as high-stakes at the 
time of the testing. There were 122 valid testing samples: eighth grade in 1998 and 2002 and fourth 
grade in 2002 (see Table 1, note there was no cohort sample). Also, the absence of parent education 
data from fourth grade testing samples reduced the number of samples available in analyses that 
included parent education.  
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Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations of Single Year Writing Achievement  
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score — 59 149.09 8.69 63 149.22 7.63 -0.09 
% Above Basic .94*** 59 82.79 5.81 63 83.70 4.50 -0.96 
% Above Proficient .95*** 59 25.47  7.89 63 24.44 7.69 0.73 
% Low family income -.53*** 59 36.61 12.17 63 43.12 11.75 -3.00** 
% Parent college educ .52*** 38 48.92 5.91 39 44.05 5.42 3.76***
% Black/Hispanic -.40*** 59 19.92 21.29 63 31.30 14.45 -3.48***
% Excluded disabled -.06 59 3.95 1.36 63 4.79 1.71 -3.07** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Analyses showed that writing proficiency did not differ between states with and without high 
stakes testing (see Table 8). Bivariate correlations between demographics and writing achievement 
revealed three demographic characteristics that were significantly associated with higher writing 
achievement: fewer low income families, higher parent education, and fewer minority students. 
Table 9 
Predicting Three Indicators of Single Year Writing Achievement 
 Scale Score % Above Basic % Above Proficient 
 parent edu no parent edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu 
 n = 76 n = 121 n = 76 n = 121 n = 76 n = 121 
Demographics R2 = .33*** R2 = .25*** R2 = .27*** R2 = .22*** R2 = .32*** R2 = .31***
 % Low income -0.44** -0.46*** -0.32 -0.39*** -0.48** -0.61*** 
 % Parent college 0.23 — 0.26 — 0.19 — 
 % Black/Hispanic 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.13  0.08  0.08 
 % Excl/disabled 0.11 0.27** 0.15 0.26** 0.06 0.18* 
High Stakes Indicator R2 = .07 R2 = .01 R2 = .12** R2 = .02 R2 = .04 R2 = .01 
 Present (yes/no) -0.02 0.08 0.13 0.18 -0.13 -0.03 
 Years w/ testing 0.28 -0.04 0.26 -0.02 0.29 0.01 
 High-Stakes Index 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.14 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
 
In the regression analyses (see Table 9), the demographic factors predicted on average 30% 
of the variance among states’ achievement on the NAEP writing test (see Table 9), with parent 
income making the greatest unique contribution to the prediction (Beta coefficients are reported in 
Table 9). The high stakes indicators significantly added to the prediction of a greater proportion of 
students reaching Basic (R2 = .12, p < .01). When excluding parent education from the regression 
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equation, the demographics continued to predict significant proportions of variance in writing 
achievement; however, the high-stakes testing indicators no longer added to the prediction of 
writing achievement. On the writing test, similar to the results in reading, demographics continue to 
predict the greater proportion of variance in students’ achievement on the NAEP. 
Four-year change in writing achievement within grade level. Means and standard deviations 
for the changes in writing achievement and in demographic characteristics between four year testing 
periods within the same grade levels (eighth to eighth grade) are shown in Table 10. In these 
analyses, there were only 33 testing samples (states that participated in eighth grade writing testing in 
both 1998 and 2002). Changes in writing achievement within grade level did not differ between 
states with and without high stakes testing. Bivariate correlations revealed positive relationships 
between changes in writing scores and both parent education and percentage of students excluded 
from testing. In the regression analyses (see Table 11), changes in demographic factors significantly 
predicted changes in writing scale scores and in proportion of students reaching Basic and Proficient 
within grade levels; and high-stakes testing indicators did not add significantly to the prediction of 
changes in any of the indicators of writing achievement. 
 
Table 10 
Means and Standard Deviations of Change in Writing Achievement (Same Grade) 
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score .84*** 13 2.54 2.70 20 4.25 5.15 -1.10 
% Above Basic .89*** 13 0.54 2.60 20 1.60 4.33 -0.79 
% Above Proficient .90*** 13 3.38 2.84 20 5.35 4.58 -1.38 
% Low family income -.30 13 -2.93 4.63 20 -4.27 4.71 -0.80 
% Parent college educ .44** 13 -2.62 1.19 20 -2.80 2.71 0.23 
% Black/Hispanic -.32 13 2.65 2.20 20 2.20 2.46 0.49 
% Excluded disabled .45** 13 -0.94 1.24 20 -0.55 2.21 -0.63 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Four-year change in writing achievement within cohort. The necessary data for these analyses 
were not available, as fourth graders were not given the writing test in 1998. 
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Table 11 
Predicting Change in Three Indicators of Writing Achievement (Same Grade) 
 Scale Score n = 32 
% Above Basic 
n = 32 
% Above 
Proficient 
n = 32 
Demographics R2 = .37* R2 = .30* R2 = .32* 
 % Low income -0.11 -0.07 -0.19 
 % Parent college 0.31 0.24 0.39* 
 % Black/Hispanic -0.20 -0.30 -0.07 
 % Excl/disabled 0.26 0.20 0.12 
High-stakes Indicator R2 = .04 R2 = .05 R2 = .04 
 Present (yes/no) 0.35 0.29 0.29 
 Years w/ testing -0.18 -0.03 -0.12 
 High-Stakes Index -0.23 -0.26 -0.02 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
Mathematics 
Single year achievement. Means and standard deviations for the achievement indicators in 
math and the demographic characteristics of all available testing samples are shown in Table 12. 
There were 250 valid testing samples (173 samples in states with high stakes testing and 77 in states 
without high stakes testing); however family income was not available for the 1992 testing period, 
and parent education was not available for fourth grade testing samples. A listwise deletion of testing 
samples with missing data within each analysis produced smaller samples sizes for analyses that 
included family income and/or parent education (slight variations in samples sizes across analyses 
are due to single cases of missing data within one or two states’ data). Sample sizes are shown in the 
tables for each analysis. 
 
Table 12 
Means and Standard Deviations of Single Year Math Achievement 
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score — 173 245.35 26.53 77 243.90 24.32 0.41 
% Above Basic .31*** 173 61.02 12.38 77 58.97 10.21 1.27 
% Above Proficient .48*** 173 20.45 7.08 77 18.64 6.59 1.91 
% Low family income -.60*** 101 34.88 11.73 65 40.87 12.29 -3.16** 
% Parent college educ .73*** 83 42.29 6.75 38 38.18 5.80 3.24** 
% Black/Hispanic -.31*** 173 20.67 19.56 77 28.97 15.63 -3.28***
% Excluded disabled .14* 173 6.32 2.44 77 7.91 2.62 -4.68***
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Results revealed that math achievement did not differ between states with and without high 
stakes testing (see Table 12). However, bivariate correlations between demographics and math scale 
scores revealed all four demographic characteristics were significantly associated with higher math 
achievement: fewer low income families, higher parent education, fewer minorities, and more 
students excluded from testing.  
In the regression analyses (see Table 13), demographic factors predicted about 77% of the 
variance among the states’ achievement on the NAEP math test (78% in scale scores, 77% for 
students reaching Basic, and 76% for students reaching Proficient), with higher parent education, 
fewer low income, and less ethnicity making unique contributions to the prediction (Beta 
coefficients are reported in Table 13). In the second step of the regression, the high-stakes index 
predicted a small (3%), but significant, proportion of additional variance in scale scores and in 
percentage of students reaching Basic. However, similar to the results with reading achievement, 
beta coefficients revealed that high stakes samples had lower achievement than did non-high stakes 
samples; but within high stakes samples, more years of testing and higher index scores predicted 
greater achievement.  
The regression was run again excluding parent education (so that fourth grade testing 
samples were included in the analysis), and the demographic factors continued to predict significant 
proportions of variance in math achievement (38% of scale scores, 57% of students reaching Basic, 
and 63% of students reaching Proficient) with family income and ethnicity predicting the most 
unique variance. The high stakes indicators continued to predict a small, but significant, additional 
proportion of variance in percentage of students reaching Basic; but again, having high stakes was 
related to lower achievement, although years of testing and the high stakes indicator predicted higher 
math achievement.  
 
Table 13 
Predicting Three Indicators of Single Year Math Achievement  
 Scale Score % Above Basic % Above Proficient 
 parent edu no parent edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu 
 n = 77 n = 162 n = 77 n = 162 n = 77 n = 162 
Demographics R2 = .78*** R2 = .38*** R2 = .77*** R2 = .57*** R2 = .76*** R2 = .63***
 % Low income -0.38*** -0.72*** -0.32** -0.45*** -0.38*** -0.70***
 % Parent college 0.40*** — 0.39*** — 0.48*** — 
 % Black/Hispanic -0.67** 0.26*** -0.33*** -0.42*** -0.16 -0.16* 
 % Excl/disabled 0.01 -0.13 0.02 0.16** 0.03 0.10 
High Stakes Indicator R2 = .03* R2 = .04* R2 = .03* R2 = .01 R2 = .02 R2 = .01 
 Present (yes/no) -0.11 -0.07 -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 
 Years w/ testing 0.19* 0.18 0.21* 0.12 0.09 0.05 
 High-Stakes Index 0.18* 0.17* 0.16* 0.07 0.18 0.15 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
Four-year change in math achievement within grade level. Means and standard deviations for 
the change in the three indicators of math achievement and the changes in demographic 
characteristics between four year testing periods within the same grade levels (fourth to fourth grade 
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and eighth to eighth grade) are shown in Table 14. There were 144 valid testing samples: 38 states 
participated in fourth grade math testing in both 1992 and 1996, 36 participated in fourth grade 
math testing in both 1996 and 2000, 36 states participated in eighth grade math testing in both 1992 
and 1996, and 34 participated in eighth grade math testing in both 1996 and 2000. Analyses showed 
that high stakes samples had slightly greater change in scale scores (less than 2 points) and slightly 
greater change in proportion of students reaching Basic (less than 3%); but changes in proportion of 
students reaching Proficient did not differ between states with and without high stakes testing. 
Bivariate correlations between demographics and math achievement revealed that a decrease in the 
percentage of Black and Hispanic students was related to increases in math achievement.  
Table 14 
Means and Standard Deviations of Change in Math Achievement (Same Grade) 
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score .99*** 84 2.31 3.27 60 3.60 3.07 -2.39*
% Above Basic .86*** 84 2.39 3.47 60 4.87 3.75 -4.07*
% Above Proficient .70*** 84 2.11 2.56 60 2.90 2.63 -1.81 
% Low family income -.18 33 2.14 3.33 37 1.13 2.85  1.37 
% Parent college educ .17 41 1.41 2.25 29 2.28 2.43 -1.53 
% Black/Hispanic -.23** 84 1.44 2.55 60 1.57 3.44 -0.25 
% Excluded disabled .04 84 1.66 1.78 60 1.79 2.45 -0.37 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
However, in the regression analyses (see Table 15), the combined demographic factors did 
not significantly predict changes in math achievement; but the high stakes index significantly added 
to the prediction of changes in math scale scores, with greater high stakes index scores predicting 
higher math scale scores (both the presence of high stakes testing and years of testing predicted scale 
scores in the negative direction). In the second regression, with parent education removed (thereby 
including fourth graders and doubling the sample size), changes in demographics still did not predict 
changes in math achievement. The high stakes indicators continued to add to the prediction of scale 
scores, with the presence of high stakes testing and years of testing negatively related to gains in 
math achievement, and the high stakes indicator positively related to changes in math scale scores. 
The high stakes indicators still did not predict changes in either percent Basic or percent Proficient. 
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Table 15 
Predicting Change in Three Indicators of Math Achievement (Same Grade) 
 Scale Score % Above Basic % Above Proficient 
 parent edu no parent edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu 
 n = 32 n = 70 n = 32 n = 70 n = 32 n = 70 
Demographics R2 = .17 R2 = .07 R2 = .20 R2 = .19 R2 = .15 R2 = .12 
 % Low income -0.20 -0.22 -0.37 -0.37 -0.26 -0.30 
 % Parent college 0.13 — -0.07 — 0.00 — 
 % Black/Hispanic -0.21 -0.05 -0.17 -0.16 -0.01 -0.03 
 % Excl/disabled 0.07 0.07 0.08 -0.11 0.25 0.15 
High Stakes Indicator R2 = .25* R2 = .15* R2 = .13 R2 = .13 R2 = .17 R2 = .05 
 Present (yes/no) -0.12 0.18 -0.34 -0.34 -0.29 0.13 
 Years w/ testing -0.11 -0.16 -0.25 -0.22 -0.04 -0.18 
 High-Stakes Index 0.66* 0.35* 0.48 0.45 0.61 0.21 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
 
Four-year change in mathematics achievement within cohort. Means and standard deviations 
for the changes in math achievement and in demographic characteristics between four year testing 
periods within the same cohort (fourth to eighth grade) are shown in Table 16. There were 74 valid 
testing samples: 39 states participated in fourth to eighth grade math testing from 1992 to 1996 and 
35 states participated in fourth to eighth grade reading testing from 1996 to 2000. In the analyses on 
math achievement, the states with high stakes testing had a slightly smaller change in math scale 
scores (less than 2 points), but a slightly higher change in proportion of students reaching Proficient 
(less than 1%) than did states with no high stakes testing.  
 
Table 16 
Means and Standard Deviations of Change in Math Achievement (Cohort) 
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score .94*** 43 51.39 3.92 31 49.63 3.35 1.98*
% Above Basic .89*** 43 2.29 3.57 31 1.20 3.21 1.33 
% Above Proficient .88*** 43 0.56 2.39 31 1.19 2.24  2.02*
% Low family income -.19 16 -5.62 3.23 19 -7.30 2.68  1.65 
% Parent college educ     — — — — — — — — 
% Black/Hispanic -.05 43 0.49 2.26 31 -.03 3.16 0.77 
% Excluded disabled .11 43 0.70 1.92 31 1.91 2.45 -1.73 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Furthermore, in the regression analysis, changes in demographic characteristics did not 
significantly predict changes in any indicators of math achievement from fourth to eighth grade (see 
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Table 17; note that parent education was not available for either cohort and that family income was 
available for only one cohort); and the high stakes indicators predicted no additional variance in any 
of the math achievement factors. It was interesting to note, however, that although not significant, 
the proportions of variance predicted by the high stakes indicators were fairly large (in the 15–20% 
range) in the equation with fewer samples; but as the number of samples increased, the proportion 
of variance predicted by the high stakes factors decreased. In addition, the direction of the beta 
coefficients did not favor the presence of high stakes testing nor the number of years of testing in 
producing higher levels of math achievement. 
 
Table 17 
Predicting Change in Math Achievement (Cohort) 
 Scale Score % Above Basic % Above Proficient 
 income no income income no income income no income 
 n = 34 n = 67 n = 34 n = 67 n = 34 n = 67 
Demographics R2 = .05 R2 = .02 R2 = .16 R2 = .05 R2 = .03 R2 = .02 
 % Low income -0.16 — -0.25 — -0.13 — 
 % Parent college — — — — — — 
 % Black/Hispanic -0.07 -0.05 -0.13 -0.14 0.00 -0.02 
 % Excl/disabled -0.13 -0.14 -0.25 -0.18 -0.10 -0.14 
High Stakes Indicator R2 = .17 R2 = .09 R2 = .15 R2 = .05 R2 = .21 R2 = .09 
 Present (yes/no)  -0.39 -0.17 -0.35 -0.14 -0.24 -0.01 
 Years w/ testing -0.24 -0.19 -0.24 -0.16 -0.42 -0.28 
 High-Stakes Index 0.31 0.05 0.51 0.18 0.24 -0.04 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
Science 
Single year achievement. Means and standard deviations for science achievement and the 
demographic characteristics of all available testing samples are shown in Table 18. There were 118 
valid testing samples: eighth grade in 1996 and 2000 and fourth grade in 2000 (see Table 1—note 
the absence of cohort analysis). Results showed that states with no high stakes testing had higher 
science achievement on all indicators, but they also had fewer low income families, higher parent 
education, a lower percentage of Black and Hispanic students, and fewer students excluded from 
testing. Bivariate correlations between demographics and science achievement revealed that these 
demographic characteristics were significantly associated with science achievement. 
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Table 18 
Means and Standard Deviations of Single Year Science Achievement 
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score — 65 151.19 9.36 53 146.27 7.73 3.03** 
% Above Basic .95*** 63 65.07 10.83 51 59.16 10.31 2.92** 
% Above Proficient .96*** 65 30.28 8.14 53 25.53 7.41 3.31** 
% Low family income -.74*** 65 31.92 8.90 53 39.69 12.22 3.99*** 
% Parent college educ .66*** 46 46.50 6.06 32 41.69 5.38 3.61*** 
% Black/Hispanic -.81*** 65 20.62 15.50 53 32.11 14.66 -4.11*** 
% Excluded disabled .14 65 7.11 2.46 53 8.62 2.82 -3.05** 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
In the regression analyses (see Table 19), on average the four demographic factors predicted 
79% of the variance among the states’ achievement on the NAEP science test with parent education 
included in the equation, and only slightly less of the variance when parent education was excluded. 
In the second step of the regressions, the high-stakes testing indicators did not add to the prediction 
of any of the science achievement measures. 
 
Table 19 
Predicting Three Indicators of Single Year Science Achievement 
 Scale Score % Above Basic % Above Proficient 
 parent edu no parent edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu parent edu 
no parent 
edu 
 n = 70 n = 110 n = 70 n = 110 n = 70 n = 110 
Demographics R2 = .78*** R2 = .69*** R2 = .80*** R2 = .60*** R2 = .79*** R2 = .66***
 % Low income -0.24* -0.37*** -0.24* -0.18* -0.21*** -0.45*** 
 % Parent college 0.30*** — 0.30*** — 0.41*** — 
 % Black/Hispanic -0.50*** -0.77*** -0.53*** -0.68*** -0.45***  -0.48*** 
 % Excl/disabled 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.21** 0.10 0.15* 
High Stakes Indicator R2 = .02 R2 = .01 R2 = .01 R2 = .01 R2 = .01 R2 = .00 
 Present (yes/no) -0.12 -0.11  -0.04 -0.04  -0.03 -0.03 
 Years w/ testing 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.04 
 High-Stakes Index 0.09 -0.01 0.03 -0.11 0.03 -0.04 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
 
Four-year change in science achievement within grade level. Means and standard deviations 
for the changes in science achievement and the changes in demographic characteristics between four 
year testing periods within the same grade levels (fourth to fourth grade and eighth to eighth grade) 
are shown in Table 20. In these analyses, there were only 34 testing samples (states that participated 
in eighth grade science testing in both 1996 and 2000). Although the states with high stakes testing 
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had a greater increase in proportion of students reaching Basic (see Table 20), the regression 
analyses revealed that the demographic factors predicted 30% to 40% of the variance in the change 
in science achievement (see Table 21); and, the high-stakes testing indicators did not add to the 
prediction. 
Four-year change in science achievement within cohort. The necessary data for these analyses 
were not available as fourth graders were not given the science test in 1996. 
 
Table 20 
Means and Standard Deviations of Change In Science Achievement (Same Grade) 
 Not High-Stakes High-Stakes  
 
Correlation 
with scale 
score n Mean SD n Mean SD t 
NAEP Scale score .95*** 16 0.07 1.98 18 1.56 3.26 -1.55 
% Above Basic .73*** 16 -0.07 2.59 18 2.59 3.26 -2.48* 
% Above Proficient .73*** 16 1.53 2.59 18 3.39 2.77 -1.97 
% Low family income -.18 16 -2.37 3.70 18 -0.85 3.03 1.30 
% Parent college education .52** 16 1.60 1.50 18 1.44 2.53 0.21 
% Black/Hispanic -.41* 16 1.73 2.19 18 0.78 3.41 0.94 
% Excluded disabled/LEP .05 16 1.88 1.36 18 2.26 2.75 -0.51 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 21 
Predicting Change in Three Indicators of Science Achievement (Same Grade) 
 Scale Score n = 32 
% Above Basic 
n = 32 
% Above 
Proficient 
n = 32 
Demographics R2 = .42** R2 = .32* R2 = .31* 
 % Low income -0.11 -0.13 -0.07 
 % Parent college 0.50** 0.16 0.32 
 % Black/Hispanic -0.38* -0.50** -0.38* 
 % Excl/disabled -0.07 0.14 0.18 
High-stakes Indicator R2 = .06 R2 = .17 R2 = .14 
 Present (yes/no) 0.14 0.52 0.37 
 Years w/ testing 0.19 0.11 0.21 
 High-Stakes Index -0.08 -0.41 -0.35 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
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Discussion 
The impact of characteristics (i.e., demographics) of the test-takers on aggregated test scores 
cannot be emphasized enough. When test scores are aggregated at any level (school, district, or 
state), the shared characteristics of the test-takers are strongly related to the variability in 
achievement results. Slight differences in demographics between states and slight changes in 
demographics over time can be associated with significant differences or changes in achievement. 
Marchant and Paulson (2001, 2005) previously demonstrated the need to consider demographics 
when interpreting aggregated SAT scores. Differences in test scores often are assumed to reflect 
differences in an intervention (such as the educational policies and practices of a state), when the 
scores reflect the collective nature of the test-takers (Marchant, 2005). In this study, simple 
comparisons of NAEP scores from states having high-stakes testing policies with those that do not 
revealed that high-stakes testing policies were often related to slightly lower NAEP scores (e.g., in 
reading and in science). However, simple comparisons of changes in NAEP scores over four years 
revealed that high-stakes testing often was related significantly to improved scores (e.g., in both 
reading and math). However, further analyses showed that most of these relationships (whether in 
favor of high stakes or non-high stakes states) disappeared once demographic differences were 
controlled. Indeed, past studies finding that high-stakes testing has relationships (either positive or 
negative) with achievement outcomes have not sufficiently controlled for demographics. Similarly, 
studies attributing significant achievement gains to high-stakes testing also have failed to adequately 
consider demographics. 
In this study, the characteristics of the NAEP test-takers accounted for the majority of the 
variance among testing samples at the state level. These results confirmed the importance of 
controlling for ethnicity and disabled/LEP exclusions, as demonstrated in previous studies using 
NAEP data, but the inclusion of family income and parent education proved especially valuable in 
predicting variability among testing samples, with both of these factors consistently adding 
significantly to the prediction of achievement. In particular, in predicting single-year reading 
achievement, the high stakes indicators were found to add significantly to the prediction, but only 
when parent education was not controlled. In those testing samples in which parent education was 
collected and thereby controlled, the high stakes indicators no longer added significantly to the 
prediction of reading achievement. Similarly, the high stakes indicators added significantly to the 
prediction of changes in reading over four years within cohort, but only when family income and 
parent education data were not available to control. Indeed, when up to 70% of the variability 
among states’ aggregated NAEP scores can be predicted by the average demographic characteristics 
of the states’ test-takers—factors outside of the control of educational policies—educators and 
policy makers should be careful when attributing differences among states’ performance to the 
policies alone. Likewise, when looking at changes in aggregated scores over time, it would be 
inappropriate to attribute those changes to educational policies or practices without careful 
consideration of other factors known to be associated with those scores.  
Despite the large role that demographics played in predicting almost all of the achievement 
outcomes, there were several interesting patterns in the role of the high stakes indicators. In reading 
achievement, the high stakes indicators were found to add significantly to the prediction of scale 
scores and percentage of students reaching Basic, and to the prediction of cohort changes in 
percentage of students reaching Basic. Inspection of the Beta coefficients, however, showed that 
having high stakes was related to lower achievement outcomes; but years of high stakes testing and 
the high stakes index were related to higher achievement outcomes. Perhaps it could be argued that 
high stakes policies need to be in place longer or need to apply greater pressure in order to improve 
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achievement. However, as discussed previously, these relationships disappeared when differences in 
all of the demographic characteristics among testing samples (i.e., family income and parent 
education) could be taken into account. Furthermore, high stakes indicators were not found to 
predict any variability in percentage of students reaching Proficient or in changes in percentage of 
students reaching Proficient over four years.  
Similarly, in writing, the high stakes indicators did predict a greater percentage of students 
reaching Basic, even after controlling for demographics; but they did not account for any variability 
in students reaching Proficient. So, even though high stakes indicators may be able to have a small 
effect the writing performance of students at the Basic level, they showed no evidence of affecting 
the performance of higher achieving students. In science, the high stakes indicators had no impact 
on any of the indicators of performance. In general, we would argue that it is inappropriate to base a 
general school improvement reform on the use of high-stakes testing, calling into question the “No 
Child Left Behind” mandate requiring annual testing as a means to improve student learning. 
The findings for math achievement proved to be a bit more complex. As with Carnoy and 
Loeb (2002) and Nichols et al. (2006), we acknowledge that differences and changes in math 
performance may be related to some aspect of high stakes testing policies, at least partially. In this 
study, the high stakes indicators added significantly to the prediction of scale scores, percentage of 
students reaching Basic, and changes in scale scores over four years (within grade), even after 
controlling for demographics. Although not significant (due probably to small number of samples in 
the equation), the high stakes indicators also predicted large proportions of variance (13%) in the 
change in percentage of students reaching Basic. Interestingly, as with reading achievement, 
although the presence of high stakes testing was related to lower math achievement, years of testing 
and the high stakes index were related to higher math achievement in a single year and the high 
stakes index to gains in math between testing periods. However, none of the high stakes indicators 
were related to percentage of students reaching Proficient.  
We might argue that the degree to which a state has put testing policies in place (as assessed 
by the high stakes index) and the number of years of testing may be associated with several practices 
that might explain the results for math proficiency. In particular, Nichols et al. (2006) suggested that 
high stakes testing policies leads to more drill and practice, a practice that would enhance math but 
not reading achievement, especially at lower grade levels when math content is more concrete. 
Similarly, we would assert that states under more accountability pressure most likely have developed 
curricular standards and have aligned teaching practices with these standards; the use of such 
standards would be related to the number of years that testing has been in place. Having educational 
policies that lead to higher achievement (e.g., standards and curricular alignment) is not being 
disputed. However, these results do not vindicate a general educational reform effort focused almost 
exclusively on testing nor does it provide adequate support to any argument that high stakes testing 
is necessary to raise student achievement. In particular, even though some impact may be seen 
among students at the lower levels (Basic), these results further support the notion that high stakes 
testing does little if anything for students at higher levels of performance (Fuller et al., 2006). 
Instead, the results suggest the need to further explore what it is about high-stakes testing policies 
that might influence mathematics achievement, and at what grade levels. 
The purpose of high stakes testing continues to be called into question. In addition to the 
series of studies by Berliner and colleagues and by Marchant and colleagues, other recent research 
has failed to support the contention that accountability policies result in a decrease in the 
achievement gaps related to race and SES (Borman et al., 2004; Lee & Wong, 2004). In light of the 
expense and unintended negative consequences being identified in the research, the bottom-line 
question concerning high-stakes testing must be, is high-stakes testing worth it as a general approach 
to educational reform? If this type of testing did not take much time or much money, the lack of 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 14 No. 30 24 
consistent evidence supporting achievement would not be as important. However, the Government 
Accountability Office estimates that states will spend between $1.9 billion and $5.3 billion in the 
next six years (Olson, 2004). In a time when states and school districts are facing difficult choices 
due to financial constraints, every educational expense should be justified. It is time to slow the 
bandwagon and thoroughly examine what it is about high-stakes testing that is worth the price. 
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Appendix A 
States’ Participation In NAEP Reading, Writing, Math, And Science Testing 
1992–2002 
 
Table A1 
States’ Participation In NAEP Reading And Writing Testing For Each Testing Period 1992–
2002 
 
 Reading  Writing 
Year 1992 1994 1998 1998 2002 2002  1998 2002 2002 
Grade 4 4 4 8 4 8  8 4 8 
Missing 
Data 
$ 
Edu. 
$ 
Edu. 
 
Edu.  
 
Edu.    
 
Edu.  
Total 
States 42 40 40 37 44 42  36 44 42 
AL x x x x x x  x x x 
AK — — — — — —  — — — 
AZ x x x x x x  x x x 
AR x x x x x x  x x x 
CA x x x x x x  x x x 
CO x x x x — —  x — — 
CT x x x x x x  x x x 
DC x x x x x x  x x x 
DE x x x x x x  x x x 
FL x x x x x x  x x x 
GA x x x x x x  x x x 
HI x x x x x x  x x x 
ID x — — — x x  — x x 
IL — — — — — —  — — — 
IN x x — — x x  — x x 
IA x x x — x —  — x — 
KS — — x x x x  — x x 
KY x x x x x x  x x x 
LA x x x x x x  x x x 
ME x x x x x x  x x x 
MD x x x x x x  x x x 
MA x x x x x x  x x x 
MI x — x — x x  — x x 
MN x x x x x —  x x — 
MS x x x x x x  x x x 
MO x x x x x x  x x x 
MT — x x x x x  x x x 
NE x x — — x x  — x x 
NV — — x x x x  x x x 
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 Reading  Writing 
Year 1992 1994 1998 1998 2002 2002  1998 2002 2002 
Grade 4 4 4 8 4 8  8 4 8 
Missing 
Data 
$ 
Edu. 
$ 
Edu. 
 
Edu.  
 
Edu.    
 
Edu.  
Total 
States 42 40 40 37 44 42  36 44 42 
NH x x x — — —  — — — 
NJ x x — — — —  — — — 
NM x x x x x x  x x x 
NY x x x x x x  x x x 
NC x x x x x x  x x x 
ND x x — — x x  — x x 
OH x — — — x x  — x x 
OK x — x x x x  x x x 
OR — — x x x x  x x x 
PA x x — — x x  — x x 
RI x x x x x x  x x x 
SC x x x x x x  x x x 
SD — — — — — —  — — — 
TN x x x x x x  x x x 
TX x x x x x x  x x x 
UT x x x x x x  x x x 
VT — — — — x x  — x x 
VA x x x x x x  x x x 
WA — x x x x x  x x x 
WV x x x x x x  x x x 
WI x x x x — —  x — — 
WY x x x x x x  x x x 
States participating in each testing period are indicated with an x. 
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Table A2 
States’ Participation In NAEP Math And Science Testing For Each Testing Period 1992–2000 
 
 Math  Science 
Year 1992 1992 1996 1996 2000 2000  1996 2000 2000 
Grade 4 8 4 8 4 8  8 4 8 
Missing
Data 
$ 
Edu. 
$ 
 
 
Edu.  
 
Edu.    
 
Edu.  
Total 
States 
42 42 44 41 41 40  41 39 38 
AL x x x x x x  x x x 
AK — — x x — —  x — — 
AZ x x x x x x  x x x 
AR x x x x x x  x x x 
CA x x x x x x  x x x 
CO x x x x — —  x — — 
CT x x x x x x  x x x 
DC x x x x x x  x — — 
DE x x x x — —  x — — 
FL x x x x — —  x — — 
GA x x x x x x  x x x 
HI x x x x x x  x x x 
ID x x — — x x  — x x 
IL — — — — x x  — x x 
IN x x x x x x  x x x 
IA x x x x x —  x x — 
KS — — — — x x  — — — 
KY x x x x x x  x x x 
LA x x x x x x  x x x 
ME x x x x x x  x x x 
MD x x x x x x  x x x 
MA x x x x x x  x x x 
MI x x x x x x  x x x 
MN x x x x x x  x x x 
MS x x x x x x  x x x 
MO x x x x x x  x x x 
MT — — x x x x  x x x 
NE x x x x x x  x x x 
NV — — x — x x  — x x 
NH x x — — — —  — — — 
NJ x x x — — —  — — — 
NM x x x x x x  x x x 
NY x x x x x x  x x x 
NC x x x x x x  x x x 
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 Math  Science 
Year 1992 1992 1996 1996 2000 2000  1996 2000 2000 
Grade 4 8 4 8 4 8  8 4 8 
Missing
Data 
$ 
Edu. 
$ 
 
 
Edu.  
 
Edu.    
 
Edu.  
Total 
States 
42 42 44 41 41 40  41 39 38 
ND x x x x x x  x x x 
OH x x — — x x  — x x 
OK x x — — x x  — x x 
OR — — x x x x  x x x 
PA x x x — — —  — — — 
RI x x x x x x  x x x 
SC x x x x x x  x x x 
SD — — — — — —  — — — 
TN x x x x x x  x x x 
TX x x x x x x  x x x 
UT x x x x x x  x x x 
VT — — x x x x  x x x 
VA x x x x x x  x x x 
WA — — x x — —  x — — 
WV x x x x x x  x x x 
WI x x x x — —  x — — 
WY x x x x x x  x x x 
States participating in each testing period are indicated with an x. 
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